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Abstract 
This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability 
properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain 
techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first 
time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic 
stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by 
functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly 
game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed 
methodology. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic game, Cournot oligopoly, Nash equilibrium, Robust stability, Small gain. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Dynamical game-theoretical models have inherent uncertainty in many aspects. The uncertainty is related strongly to 
a number of open questions which cannot be answered a priori: 
 
1. Should the models be formulated in continuous time or discrete time? 
The answer to the above question is crucial: models in discrete time will be described by difference 
equations (see [1,2,3,5,6,11,21,33]) while models in continuous time are generally described by differential 
equations (with or without delays; see [4,31]). The answer to the above question has significant 
consequences: the perception of time for each player in a dynamic game-theoretical model affects her 
behavior.  
 
2. What are the expectation rules that a player has for the other players? 
Again the answer to the above question is crucial: the behavior of a player will heavily rely on the 
expectations for the actions of the rest players. There is a large economic literature on the effect of 
expectation rules (e.g., naïve, backward-looking, rational expectations, see [3,5,10,11] and references 
therein). Moreover, if expectation rules are using delay terms then the consequences on stability can be 
important (see [4,20]).  
 
3. What are the values of the various constants involved in a dynamic game-theoretical model? 
In many dynamic games, the rate of change of the action of one player is assumed to be proportional to 
either the deviation of the action from the best reply (see for example [6,11]) or the gradient of the payoff 
function (see for example [6,31]). The value of the proportionality constant cannot be known a priori. 
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Therefore, the answers to important questions such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium point, the uniqueness of a 
Nash equilibrium point and its stability properties are usually related to the specific assumptions made in order to 
cope with the uncertainty. Consequently, the following question arises: 
 
“Can we extract robust information from an uncertain nonlinear economic model, 
which will hold no matter what the uncertainty is?” 
 
The present work answers it affirmatively. In some cases, we can even show the existence of a Nash equilibrium 
point, its uniqueness and its global asymptotic stability properties for all possible uncertainties. In order to be able to 
do this we propose the following methodology: 
 
• First, we formulate our models in continuous time by means of Functional Difference Equations (see [9,15-
19,32]). By doing so we convert a finite-dimensional problem to an infinite-dimensional problem, which 
seems to be a clear disadvantage at first sight. However, in this way we can obtain all features of continuous 
time and discrete time models. Indeed, we will show that many models appeared in the literature can be 
considered as special cases of our proposed model. 
 
• Second, we do not assume a specific expectation rule: instead, we will only assume that the expectation is 
consistent with the history of the game (consistent backward looking expectation; see Definition 2.1 below). 
 
• In order to be able to extract important information from the uncertain model we use advanced stability 
methods. Indeed, by applying small-gain analysis (see [17,18,19]), we can guarantee that the Nash 
equilibrium point is unique and globally asymptotically stable (see Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 below).  
 
    To our knowledge, this is the first time that such results are presented for dynamical game-theoretical nonlinear 
models. The only other work, which we have found and can address such questions, is [21]: our results generalize the 
results in [21]. Moreover, the results of [21] are applied in a discrete-time framework and cannot be used for the 
analysis of models in continuous time. As a byproduct of our work, we will also give conditions for uniqueness of a 
fixed point (see Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 below), which can be used in conjunction with classical fixed-point 
theorems and are different from other uniqueness conditions in the literature (see [8]). 
 
    It should be noticed that the stability/uniqueness conditions obtained by the proposed methodology will be more 
demanding conditions than the ones which can be obtained from the study of a specific model (with specific 
expectation rules, specific values for the constants involved in the model and with a specific perception of time). 
However, this is expected since the stability/uniqueness conditions obtained by the proposed methodology are 
sufficient conditions for global asymptotic stability for an uncertain model, which contains many other models as 
special cases. To this end stability analysis by means of nonlinear small-gain theorems is utilized. Small-Gain results 
have been used frequently in stability studies (see [7,12,13,14,17,18,19]) and are based on variations of the Input-to-
State Stability property introduced by E. D. Sontag in [26] and the Input-to-Output Stability property (see 
[14,16,27,28]).   
 
    The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we apply the above described methodology to the Cournot 
dynamic oligopoly problem. There is a vast literature on this well-studied problem (see for instance 
[1,3,4,5,6,11,29,31,33]). For this specific problem, we describe in detail our proposed methodology and we show how 
we can obtain results on the stability properties of the Cournot equilibrium, which do not depend on the form of the 
uncertainty. The presentation of the special case of the Cournot game before the general case was preferred for 
tutorial purposes: all issues arising in the general case are present in the Cournot game. In Section 3, we proceed to 
the more general case of dynamic strategic games and in Section 4 we discuss the problem of accommodating the 
rational expectations. Our concluding remarks are given in Section 5. Finally, in the Appendix, we give the proofs of 
certain results of this work.  
 
 
Notations Throughout this paper we adopt the following notations:  
∗  For a vector nx ℜ∈  we denote by x  its usual Euclidean norm.  
∗  +ℜ  denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. For every +ℜ∈t , ][t  denotes the integer part of t , i.e., the 
largest integer being less than or equal to t . 
∗  We say that a non-decreasing continuous function ++ ℜ→ℜ:γ  is of class N  if 0)0( =γ .  
∗  Let nIx ℜ→:  with Iba ⊆],[  and +∞<
∈
)(sup τ
τ
x
I
. We denote by )(sup],[ ττ xx baba ≤≤= .  
∗  Let nU ℜ⊆  be a closed convex set. By )(Pr xU  we denote the projection of nx ℜ∈  on nU ℜ⊆ . 
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∗  The norm of a normed linear space X  will be denoted by X . More specifically, in the present work X   will 
denote the normed linear space of bounded functions nTx ℜ→− ]0,[:  with norm )(sup
0
τ
τ
xx
T ≤≤−
=X , for given 
0≥T . If naTx ℜ→− ],[: , where 0≥a , is a bounded mapping then X∈tx  with ],0[ at∈  is defined by 
}:)({ tTtxxt ≤≤−= ττ  as usually in systems with delays (see [9]). 
∗  For a vector nn SSqqq ××∈= …11 ),...,(  we will use the notation (see [30]) 
 
),...,,,...,( 111 niii qqqqq +−− =  for ni <<1  and 3≥n  
 
),...,( 21 nqqq =− , ),...,( 11 −− = nn qqq  for 2≥n  
 
i.e., iq−  is the vector of order 1−n  after deleting the i-th component ii Sq ∈ of the vector 
nn SSqqq ××∈= …11 ),...,( . 
 
 
2. Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly 
 
We consider the case of Cournot oligopoly where n  players produce quantities of a single homogeneous product. The 
payoff function for each player is expressed by: 
 
2
2
1
iiiiii qKqcpq −−=π , ni ,...,1=                                                              (2.1) 
 
where ii cK , , ni ,...,1=  are constants, ],0[ ii Qq ∈ , ni ,...,1=  is the quantity of the commodity produced by the i-th 
player, 0>iQ  is the maximum level of production of the product for the i-th player and 0≥p  is the price of the 
commodity.  
 
Assuming a linear demand function: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= ∑
=
n
i
iqabp
1
                                                                                    (2.2) 
 
where 0, >ba  are constants satisfying ∑
=
≥
n
i
iQa
1
 and ini
Kb
,..,1
min
2
1
=−> , we obtain the best reply mapping for each 
one of the players: 
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,0max,min:)( , ni ,...,1=                              (2.3) 
 
We define: 
 
n
nQQQS ℜ⊂×××= ],0[],0[],0[: 21 …                                                             (2.4) 
 
Sqqq n ∈= ),...,( 1                                                                             (2.5) 
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##                                     (2.6) 
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and we notice that the set nS ℜ⊂  as defined by (2.4) is compact and convex and that the map SSF →:  as defined 
by (2.6) is continuous. Consequently, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees the existence of at least one Nash 
equilibrium Sq ∈∗  with 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−+
−== ∑
≠
∗∗
−
∗
ij
j
ii
i
iiii qKb
b
Kb
cab
Qqfq
22
,0max,min)(  for ni ,...,1= . 
 
Next we assume that the dynamics of the game are described in continuous time as follows: 
 
• every player forms an expectation for the behavior of all other players at each time 0≥t : the expectation of 
the i-th player for the production level of the j-th player at time 0≥t  will be denoted by ],0[)(exp, jji Qtq ∈  
( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), 
• every player determines her production level as a convex combination of a past production level and the best 
reply response based on the expectations for the behavior of all other players at each time 0≥t , i.e.,  
 
{ }{ }
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−+
−−+−= ∑
≠ij
ji
ii
i
iiiiiii tqKb
b
Kb
cab
QtttqQttq )(
22
,0max,min))(1())((,0max,min)()( exp,θτθ , ni ,...,1=  
       (2.7) 
 
where ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ni ,...,1=  are in general unknown functions, 10 <Θ≤ , 
Tr ≤<0   are constants (in general unknown). 
 
    The reader should notice that (2.7) is a model that evolves in continuous time, i.e., +ℜ∈t . If the expectation rules 
)(exp, tq ji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), and the functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ  ( ni ,...,1= ) were known, we 
would have an accurate description of the dynamics of the Cournot oligopoly game. However, we will not assume 
exact knowledge of the expectation rules but a specific consistency condition. First we give the definition for a 
Consistent Backward-looking expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . 
 
Definition 2.1: An expectation rule )(exp, tq ji  (where ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) is called a Consistent Backward-looking 
expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  if there exist constants Tr ≤<0  such that: 
 
],[
exp
, )(sup)( rtTtjjjjrtTt
jji qqqqqtq −−
∗∗
−≤≤−
∗ −=−≤− τ
τ
, for all 0≥t                                  (2.8) 
 
In other words the consistency condition (2.8) recognizes that it is not logical for i-th player to expect that the 
production level of the j-th manufacturer will deviate from its equilibrium level more than the highest deviation she 
has experienced in the past. Next we present some examples of Consistent Backward-looking expectation rules: 
 
1) ∗
=
−+−= ∑ jjim
l
ljijljijiji qtattqtwtatq ))(1())(()()()( ,
1
,,,,,
exp
, τ , where ]1,0[)(, ∈ta ji , 0)(,, >≥≥ rtT ljiτ , 0)(,, ≥tw lji  
with ∑
=
=
m
l
lji tw
1
,, )(1  for all 0≥t  and ml ,...,1= . In discrete-time models the case ][)(,, tlttlji −+=τ , 1)(, ≡ta ji , 
0)( ,,,, ≥≡ ljilji wtw  with ∑
=
=
m
l
ljiw
1
,,1  is the usual backward-looking expectation, which gives 
∑
=
−=
m
l
jljiji lkqwtq
1
,,
exp
, )()(  for )1,[ +∈ kkt .  
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2) ∗
−
−
−++= ∫ jji
r
T
jjijiji qtadsstqshtatq ))(1()()()()( ,,,
exp
, , where Tr <<0 , ]1,0[)(, ∈ta ji  for all 0≥t , 
ℜ→−− ],[:, rTh ji  is a Lebesgue integrable function with 0)(, ≥sh ji  for almost all ],[ rTs −−∈  and ∫−
−
=
r
T
ji dssh )(1 , . 
Of course, in this case it is required that )(tq j  must be Lebesgue integrable and essentially bounded.  
 
 
We notice the following important fact for consistent backward-looking expectations: 
FACT I: )(exp, tq ji  (where ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) is a Consistent Backward-looking expectation with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  if and only if there exist constants Tr ≤<0  and a function ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  such that: 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+= −−
∗∗
],[,
exp
, )(,0max,min)( rtTtjjjijjji
qqtdqQtq , 0≥∀t                                    (2.9) 
 
Proof of Fact I: Assume first that )(exp, tq ji  (where ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) is a Consistent Backward-looking expectation 
with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ ,i.e., that (2.8) holds. We distinguish the following cases.  
 
Case 1: If 0)(exp, =tq ji , then (2.8) implies that ],[ rtTtjjj qqq −−
∗∗ −≤ . In this case we define 1)(, −=td ji  and equality 
(2.9) holds. 
 
Case 2: If jji Qtq =)(exp, , then (2.8) implies that ],[ rtTtjjjj qqqQ −−
∗∗ −≤− . In this case we define 1)(, =td ji  and 
equality (2.9) holds. 
 
Case 3: If ),0()(exp, jji Qtq ∈  and 0],[ >− −−
∗
rtTtjj
qq  then equality (2.9) holds with 
( )
],[
exp
,exp
,,
)(
)(sgn)(
rtTtjj
jji
jjiji
qq
qtq
qtqtd
−−
∗
∗
∗
−
−
−= . Inequality (2.8) implies that 1)(, ≤td ji .  
 
Case 4: If ),0()(exp, jji Qtq ∈  and 0],[ =− −−
∗
rtTtjj
qq  then inequality (2.8) implies that ∗= jji qtq )(exp, . In this case 
equality (2.9) holds for arbitrary ]1,1[)(, −∈td ji .  
 
On the other hand, if (2.9) holds then ],0[)(exp, jji Qtq ∈  for all 0≥t . Moreover, the reader can verify that inequality 
(2.8) holds. The proof is complete.          
  
 
For the dynamical system (2.7) we make the following assumption: 
  
 
(H): All expectation rules )(exp, tq ji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to 
the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ .  
 
The previous fact shows that hypothesis (H) is equivalent to the existence of constants Tr ≤<0  and functions 
]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) such that the following equalities hold for all ni ,...,1= : 
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],[,
)(,0max,min
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θ
τθ
 
       (2.10) 
 
In general the functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) as well as the 
constants 10 <Θ≤ , Tr ≤<0  are unknown. Therefore, the dynamical system (2.10) is an uncertain dynamical 
system described by Functional Difference Equations (FDEs) (see [9,15-19,32]). In order to study the behavior of the 
solutions of (2.10) we define the dimensionless deviation variables 
i
ii
i Q
qtq
tx
∗−= )()(  ( ni ,...,1= ) and we obtain 
from (2.10) for ni ,...,1= : 
 { }{ }
( ) { }{ }
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
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⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
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+−−−−−+
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≠ −−ij rtTt
jjijjiiiiiii
iiiiii
xtdLgRLMLLt
ttxLLttx
],[,,
)(,0max,1min,max,1min)(1
))((,max,1min)()(
θ
τθ
        (2.11) 
 
where ]1,0[∈=
∗
i
i
i Q
q
L , 
ii
i
i QKb
cab
M
)2( +
−= , 0
2
>+= ii Kb
bR , 0, >=
i
j
ji Q
Q
g  for ij ≠ , ni ,...,1=  are constants 
which satisfy 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−= ∑
≠ij
jjiiii LgRML ,,0max,1min  for all ni ,...,1= . 
 
 
Remarks and Examples about systems (2.10), (2.11): 
 
a) The reader should notice that system (2.11) is an infinite-dimensional dynamical system with state space X   being 
the normed linear space of bounded functions nTx ℜ→− ]0,[:  with norm )(sup
0
τ
τ
xx
T ≤≤−
=X . Indeed, by using the 
method of steps, given an initial condition X∈0x  and functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , 
]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) then one can in principle determine from (2.11) the solution 
n
n txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ],0( rt∈  with )())(),...,(()( 01 ττττ xxxx n =′=  for all ]0,[ T−∈τ . Then we can 
determine from (2.11) the solution nn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ]2,( rrt∈ . Continuing this way, we can 
determine from (2.11) the solution nn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ])1(,( rkkrt +∈ , where k  is a positive integer. 
The solution is indeed bounded and exists for all 0≥t , since (2.11) guarantees that ]1,[)( iii LLtx −−∈  for all 0≥t , 
ni ,...,1= . The state of system (2.11) will be denoted by X∈≤≤−= }:)({ tTtxxt ττ  as usually in systems with 
delays (see [9]) and the components of the state by }:)({, tTtxx iti ≤≤−= ττ  for ni ,...,1= . 
 
b) The reader should also notice that X∈0  is an equilibrium point for system (2.11). Indeed, for every functions 
],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), X∈= 00tx  implies X∈= 0tx  for all 
0tt ≥ . This equilibrium point corresponds to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  (the deviation variables have been 
defined by 
i
ii
i Q
qtq
tx
∗−= )()(  for ni ,...,1= ).  
 
c) All discrete-time models of the form: 
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,0max,min))(1()()()1( exp,θθ , ni ,...,1=            (2.12) 
with 
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∗
=
−+−=+ ∑ jjim
l
jljijiji qkalkqkwkakq ))(1()()()()1( ,
0
,,,
exp
,                                               (2.13) 
 
where mk,  are non-negative integers, ]1,0[)(, ∈ka ji  ( nji ,...,1, = ), ],0[)( Θ∈kiθ  ( ni ,...,1= ) with )1,0[∈Θ , 
0)(,, ≥kw lji  with ∑
=
=
m
l
lji kw
0
,, )(1  for all 0≥k  and ml ,...,0=  ( nji ,...,1, = ), are included in the uncertain model 
(2.10) and its equivalent expression (2.11) in the sense that for every model of the form (2.12), (2.13) one can give 
functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) such that the solution of (2.10) 
coincides with the solution obtained by the discrete-time model (2.12), (2.13).  
 
d) All continuous-time models of the form:  
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where 0>iμ  are constants and  )(exp, tq ji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are Consistent Backward-looking expectations with 
respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ , are included in the uncertain model (2.10). Indeed, for 0>≥ rt  the 
solution of (2.14) implies the following integral equations: 
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,0max,min)(exp)()exp()( exp, , ni ,...,1=  
 
From the above expression under the assumption that the mappings )(exp, tqt ji→  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are continuous, 
we can conclude that for all rt ≥  and ni ,...,1= , there exists ],[)( trttg i −∈ , ni ,...,1=  such that 
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The reader may verify that for Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point 
Sq ∈∗ , the above model can be described by the uncertain model (2.10) with )exp()( rt ii μθ −≡ , rti ≡)(τ , 
ni ,...,1=  and 1)exp(max:
,...,1
<−=Θ
=
ri
ni
μ .  
 
    The crucial question that can be posed is the question of robust asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium 
Sq ∈∗  for system (2.10) or equivalently the question of robust asymptotic stability X∈0  for system (2.11). The 
reader can obtain rigorous definitions for robust global asymptotic stability in [15-19]. The following theorem is the 
main result of the present section and shows that for certain values of the parameters involved, the Nash equilibrium 
Sq ∈∗  is robustly globally asymptotically stable for system (2.10) in the sense that for every initial condition and for 
every set of functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), the solution 
n
n tqtqtq ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  of system (2.10) satisfies ∗+∞→ = qtqt )(lim . 
 
 
Theorem 2.2: X∈0  is Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (2.11), if the following set of conditions 
holds for each np ,...,2= : 
 
1)1(
1
<− pii nRR p…                                                                        (2.15) 
for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . 
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In other words, if conditions (2.15) hold then the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  is robustly Globally Asymptotically 
Stable with respect to all possible Consistent Backward-looking expectation rules with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ , )(exp, tq ji , nji ,...,1, = , ji ≠ . It should be noticed that conditions (2.15) are more 
demanding inequalities than other stability conditions in the literature. However, this is expected since conditions 
(2.15) are sufficient conditions for global asymptotic stability for the uncertain model (2.10) which contains many 
models studied in the literature as special cases. 
 
Conditions (2.15) are termed as small-gain conditions in Mathematical Control Theory (see [17,18,19]). For 2=n  
conditions (2.15) are equivalent to the inequality: 
 
121 <RR  
 
For 3=n , conditions (2.15) are equivalent to the following four inequalities: 
 
14 21 <RR , 14 31 <RR , 14 32 <RR , 18 321 <RRR                                            (2.16) 
 
For 4=n , conditions (2.15) are equivalent to the following eleven inequalities: 
 
19 21 <RR , 19 31 <RR , 19 41 <RR , 19 32 <RR , 19 42 <RR , 19 43 <RR  
 
127 321 <RRR , 127 421 <RRR , 127 431 <RRR , 127 432 <RRR  
 
181 4321 <RRRR  
 
The proof of Theorem 2.2 relies heavily on recent results on dynamical systems (see [19]) and techniques developed 
for delay systems (see [18,19]) and is provided at the Appendix. An interesting corollary for the Cournot oligopoly 
game is given next. 
 
Corollary 2.3: If conditions (2.15) hold for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠  then the Nash 
equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  is unique for the game described by (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5). 
 
 
The reader should notice that Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees the existence of the Nash equilibrium 
Sq ∈∗  but does not guarantee uniqueness. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2.3: Suppose that there exists Sq ∈∗∗  with 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−+
−= ∑
≠
∗∗∗∗
ij
j
ii
i
ii qKb
b
Kb
cab
Qq
22
,0max,min  for ni ,...,1=  and ∗∗∗ ≠ qq . This implies that 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−−−−=−= ∑
≠
∗∗∗
ij
jjjiiiiii
i
ii
i yLgRLMLLQ
qq
y )(,max,1min: ,  for ni ,...,1= . Using the previous 
equalities, the reader can verify that the solution of (2.11) with initial condition Pyx =0 , where 
X∈≤≤−= }0:{: τTyPy , ),...,( 1 ′= nyyy , corresponding to the constant inputs  
 
0)( ≡tiθ , ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<−
=
>
==
01
00
01
)sgn(:)(,
j
j
j
jji
yif
yif
yif
ytd , ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, =  
 
satisfies Pyxt =  for all 0≥t  ( ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ni ,...,1=  are irrelevant) and consequently we cannot have 
0)(lim =+∞→ txt . This is impossible according to Theorem 2.2. The proof is complete.           
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3. Extension to the General Case of Dynamic Games 
 
The approach described in the previous section for the Cournot oligopoly game can be extended to any strategic 
game.  
 
Consider a strategic game with n  players and ikiS ℜ⊆  ( ni ,...,1= ) being the action space for each one of the 
players. We assume that the best reply mapping for each one of the players is a function 
iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3≥n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...: , 
satisfying the following inequalities: 
 
)),((),( iiiiiii qqfqq −−− < ππ , for all ii Sq ∈  with )( iii qfq −≠ , ni ,...,1=                  (3.1) 
 
where ),( iii qq −π  is the payoff function of the i-th player. 
 
We assume the existence of a Nash equilibrium Sq ∈∗  for the game, where nSSS ××= …1:  is the outcome space 
for the game, i.e., there exists Sqqq n ∈= ∗∗∗ ),...,( 1  such that 
 
)( ∗−∗ = iii qfq , ni ,...,1=                                                                      (3.2) 
 
The existence of a Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem when all action spaces 
ik
iS ℜ⊆  ( ni ,...,1= ) are compact and convex and when all the best reply mappings 
iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3≥n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...:  are 
continuous mappings. 
 
Next we assume that ikiS ℜ⊆  ( ni ,...,1= ) are closed convex sets and that the dynamics of the game are described in 
continuous time as follows: 
 
• every player forms an expectation for the behavior of all other players at each time 0≥t : the expectation of 
the i-th player for the production level of the j-th player at time 0≥t  will be denoted by jji Stq ∈)(exp,  
( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), 
 
• every player determines her action as a convex combination of a past action and the best reply response 
based on the expectations for the behavior of all other players at each time 0≥t , i.e.,  
 
( )
( )
( ) ))(),...,(())(1())((Pr)()(
))(),...,(),(),...(())(1())((Pr)()(
))(),...,(())(1())((Pr)()(
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
,
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
,1
exp
2,1111111 1
tqtqftttqttq
tqtqtqtqftttqttq
tqtqftttqttq
nnnnnnnSnn
niiiiiiiiiiSii
nS
n
i
−
+−
−+−=
−+−=
−+−=
θτθ
θτθ
θτθ
#
#
                 (3.3) 
 
where ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ni ,...,1=  are in general unknown functions, 10 <Θ≤ , 
Tr ≤<0   are constants (in general unknown), 
 
• all expectation rules jji Stq ∈)(exp,  ( ij ≠ , ni ,...,1= ), are Consistent Backward-looking expectations with 
respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ , i.e., there exist constants Tr ≤<0  such that: 
 
],[
exp
, )(sup)( rtTtjjjjrtTt
jji qqqqqtq −−
∗∗
−≤≤−
∗ −=−≤− τ
τ
, for all 0≥t                            (3.4) 
 
We notice the following fact for consistent backward-looking expectations: 
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FACT II: Suppose that jkjS ℜ⊆  is a closed convex set. )(exp, tq ji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) is a Consistent Backward-
looking expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  if and only if there exist constants Tr ≤<0  
and a function { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji   such that: 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+= −−
∗∗
],[,
exp
, )(Pr)( rtTtjjjijSji
qqtdqtq
j
, 0≥∀t                                    (3.5) 
 
Proof of Fact II: Indeed, using the fact that yxyx UU −≤− )(Pr)(Pr  for every nyx ℜ∈, , where nU ℜ⊆  is a 
closed convex set, one can verify that for every { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji   the function )(exp, tq ji   defined by 
(3.5)  satisfies (3.4) and jji Stq ∈)(exp,  for all 0≥t . Hence it is a Consistent Backward-looking expectation with 
respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . On the other hand, if jji Stq ∈)(exp,  is a Consistent Backward-looking 
expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  satisfying (3.4) for all 0≥t  then the function defined 
by: 
 
( )∗
−−
∗ −−
= jji
rtTtjj
ji qtq
qq
td )(1)( exp,
],[
, , if 0],[ >− −−
∗
rtTtjj
qq  
 
0)(, =td ji , if 0],[ =− −−
∗
rtTtjj
qq  
 
satisfies { }1:)(, ≤ℜ∈∈ ddtd jkji . Moreover, (3.5) holds for all 0≥t . The proof is complete.        
 
Fact II shows that if all action spaces jkjS ℜ⊆  ( nj ,...,1= ) are closed convex sets then there exist constants 
Tr ≤<0 , 10 <Θ≤  and functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , 
nji ,...,1, = ) such that: 
 
( )
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−=
−−
∗−−−∗−−−
∗∗
−−
∗∗
−−
∗∗
− ],[111,1],[111,1
],[,1],[222,12111111
)(Pr,...,)(Pr))(1())((Pr)()(
,)(Pr,...,)(Pr))(1())((Pr)()(
11
21
rtTtnnnnnSrtTtnSnnnnSnn
rtTtnnnnSrtTtSS
qqtdqqqtdqftttqttq
qqtdqqqtdqftttqttq
nn
n
θτθ
θτθ
#  
      (3.6) 
 
In general, the constants Tr ≤<0 , 10 <Θ≤  and the functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are unknown. Therefore, the dynamical system (3.6) is an 
uncertain dynamical system described by Functional Difference Equations (FDEs) (see [9,15-19,32]). In order to 
study the behavior of the solutions of (3.6) we define the deviation variables ∗−= iii qtqtx )()(  ( ni ,...,1= ) and we 
obtain from (3.6): 
 ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) .)(Pr,...,)(Pr))(1( ))((Pr)()(
,)(Pr,...,)(Pr))(1(
))((Pr)()(
],[11,1],[11,1
1],[,1],[22,1211
111111
11
2
1
∗
−−−−
∗−−−
∗
∗∗
∗
−−
∗
−−
∗
∗∗
−++−+
−+−=
−++−+
−+−=
− nrtTtnnnnSrtTtnSnn
nnnnSnn
rtTtnnnSrtTtS
S
qxtdqxtdqft
qqttxttx
qxtdqxtdqft
qqttxttx
n
n
n
θ
τθ
θ
τθ
#                (3.7) 
 
 11
Finally, we assume that there exist functions N∈ji,~γ  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) such that the following inequalities hold 
for all Sq∈ : 
 ( )∗
≠
∗− −≤− jjji
ij
iii qqqqf ,
~max)( γ , ni ,...,1=                                                  (3.8) 
 
Using again the fact that yxyx UU −≤− )(Pr)(Pr  for every nyx ℜ∈, , where nU ℜ⊆  is a closed convex set and 
inequalities (3.8), we obtain from (3.7) for all 0≥t  and Θ>μ : 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Θ−
Θ−≤ −−≠−− ],[,],[
~max,max)(
rtTtjjiijrtTtii
xxtx γμ
μμμ , ni ,...,1=                             (3.9) 
 
 
 
Remarks and Examples about systems (3.7), (3.8): 
 
a) The reader should notice that system (3.7) is an infinite-dimensional dynamical system with state space X   being 
the normed linear space of bounded functions NTx ℜ→− ]0,[: , where nkkN ++= ...1  with norm 
)(sup
0
τ
τ
xx
T ≤≤−
=X . Indeed, by using the method of steps, given an initial condition X∈0x  and functions 
],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) then one can in principle 
determine from (3.8) the solution mn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ],0( rt∈  with )())(),...,(()( 01 ττττ xxxx n =′=  
for all ]0,[ T−∈τ . Then we can determine from (3.8) the solution Nn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ]2,( rrt∈ . 
Continuing this way, we can determine from (3.8) the solution Nn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ])1(,( rkkrt +∈ , 
where k  is a positive integer. The state of system (3.8) will be denoted by X∈≤≤−= }:)({ tTtxxt ττ  as usually in 
systems with delays (see [9]) and the components of the state by }:)({, tTtxx iti ≤≤−= ττ  for ni ,...,1= . The 
solution exists for all 0≥t  and satisfies X∈≤≤−= }:)({ tTtxxt ττ  for all 0≥t . To see this, notice that (3.9) 
implies the existence of a function N∈G  such that: 
 ( )]0,[],0[
],0[
)(sup Tr
rt
xGxtx −∈
≤=                                                               (3.10) 
 
Without loss of generality we may assume that ssG ≥)(  for all 0≥s . Inequality (3.10) implies that  
 ( )]0,[],[ TtTt xGx −− ≤ , for all ],0[ rt∈  and ( )]0,[],[ TrTr xGx −− ≤                                 (3.11) 
 
Working in this way and using induction we may establish that for every positive integer 0>k  it holds that 
 ( )]0,[)(],[ TktTt xGx −− ≤ , for all ],0[ krt∈                                                   (3.12) 
 
where )(...:)()( sGGsG
timesk
k 
	 DD= . Therefore (3.12) implies that  
 [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )XX 0/1]0,[/1],[ xGxGxx rtTrttTtt +−+− =≤= , for all 0≥t                           (3.13) 
 
where [ ]rt /  denotes the integer part of rt / . 
 
b) The reader should also notice that X∈0  is an equilibrium point for system (3.7). Indeed, for any functions 
],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), X∈= 00tx  implies 
X∈= 0tx  for all 0tt ≥ . This equilibrium point corresponds to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  (noting that the 
deviation variables have been defined by ∗−= iii qtqtx )()(  for ni ,...,1= ).  
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c) All discrete-time models of the form: 
 
))1(),...,1(())(1()()()1(
))1(),...,1(),1(),...1(())(1()()()1(
))1(),...,1(())(1()()()1(
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
,
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
1,
exp
,1
exp
2,111111
++−+=+
++++−+=+
++−+=+
−
+−
kqkqfkkqkkq
kqkqkqkqfkkqkkq
kqkqfkkqkkq
nnnnnnnn
niiiiiiiiiii
n
θθ
θθ
θθ
#
#
            (3.14) 
 
with )1(exp, +kq ji  given by (2.13), where mk,  are non-negative integers, ]1,0[)(, ∈ka ji  ( nji ,...,1, = ), ],0[)( Θ∈kiθ  
( ni ,...,1= ) with )1,0[∈Θ , 0)(,, ≥kw lji  with ∑
=
=
m
l
lji kw
0
,, )(1  for all 0≥k  and ml ,...,0=  ( nji ,...,1, = ), are 
included in the uncertain model (3.6) and its equivalent expression (3.7) in the sense that for every model of the form 
(3.14), (2.13), one can give functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , 
nji ,...,1, = ) such that the solution of (3.6) coincides with the solution obtained by the discrete-time model (3.14), 
(2.13).  
 
d) Similarly, as shown in previous section, if ),0[ +∞⊆jS  for all nj ,...,1=  and if all expectation rules  )(exp, tq ji  
( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  
and all mappings )(exp, tqt ji→  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) are continuous, then all continuous-time models of the form: 
 ( )
( ))())(),...,(()(
)())(),...,(()(
exp
1,
exp
1,
1
exp
,1
exp
2,1111
tqtqtqftq
tqtqtqftq
nnnnnnn
n
−=
−=
−μ
μ

#

 
 
where 0>iμ  are constants, are included in the uncertain model (3.6). 
 
e) The reader should notice that no continuity assumption is made for the best reply mappings of the players 
iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3≥n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...: . 
Moreover, we have not assumed that the action spaces jkjS ℜ⊆  ( nj ,...,1= ) are compact sets: we simply require 
that the action spaces are closed, convex sets. However, we have assumed the existence of a Nash equilibrium point 
Sq ∈∗  and the existence of functions N∈ji,~γ  ( ij ≠ , ni ,...,1= ) satisfying (3.8).  
 
The crucial question that can be posed is the question of robust asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium Sq ∈∗  
for system (3.6) or equivalently the question of robust asymptotic stability X∈0  for system (3.7). The following 
theorem is the main result of this section and shows that robust global stability can be determined by the functions 
N∈ji,~γ  ( ij ≠ , ni ,...,1= ) satisfying (3.8). 
 
Theorem 3.1: X∈0  is Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (3.7), if there exists 1>ω  such that the 
following set of conditions holds for each np ,...,2= :  
 ( ) ssiiiiii p <)(... 13221 ,,, γγγ DDD , 0>∀s                                                    (3.15) 
 
for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ , where )(~:)( ,, ss jiji ωγωγ = . 
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In other words, if conditions (3.15) hold then the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  is robustly Globally Asymptotically 
Stable with respect to all possible Consistent Backward-looking expectation rules with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ , )(exp, tq ji , nji ,...,1, = , ji ≠ . 
 
Conditions (3.15) are termed as cyclic small-gain conditions in Mathematical Control Theory (see [17,18,19]). For 
2=n  conditions (3.15) are equivalent to the inequalities: 
 ( ) ss <)(1,22,1 γγ  and ( ) ss <)(2,11,2 γγ , 0>∀s  
 
For 3=n , conditions (3.15) are equivalent to the following twelve inequalities for all 0>s : 
 ( ) ss <)(1,22,1 γγ , ( ) ss <)(2,11,2 γγ  
 ( ) ss <)(1,33,1 γγ , ( ) ss <)(3,11,3 γγ  
 ( ) ss <)(2,33,2 γγ , ( ) ss <)(3,22,3 γγ  
 ( )( ) ss <)(1,33,22,1 γγγ , ( )( ) ss <)(3,22,11,3 γγγ , ( )( ) ss <)(2,11,33,2 γγγ  
 ( )( ) ss <)(2,33,11,2 γγγ , ( )( ) ss <)(1,22,33,1 γγγ , ( )( ) ss <)(3,11,22,3 γγγ  
 
The reader should notice that many of the above inequalities are equivalent. For example, for 2=n  the inequality ( ) ss <)(1,22,1 γγ , for all 0>s  implies the inequality ( ) ss <)(2,11,2 γγ  for all 0>s . Similarly, for the case 3=n  the 
following five inequalities ( ) ss <)(1,22,1 γγ , ( ) ss <)(1,33,1 γγ , ( ) ss <)(2,33,2 γγ , ( )( ) ss <)(1,33,22,1 γγγ , ( )( ) ss <)(2,33,11,2 γγγ  for all 0>s , imply all twelve inequalities which express conditions (3.15) in this case. 
 
It should be noticed that for the Cournot oligopoly game studied in the previous section, the best reply mappings if  
( ni ,...,1= ) are defined by (2.3). Consequently, using the convexity of the sets ],0[ ii QS =  ( ni ,...,1= ), we obtain the 
following inequalities for ni ,...,1= : 
   
∗
≠≠
∗∗− −−+≤−+≤− ∑ jjijiij jjiiii qqnKb
bqq
Kb
bqqf max)1(
22
)(  
 
The above inequalities imply that inequalities (3.8) hold with snRs iji )1(:)(
~
, −=γ , where 
i
i Kb
bR += 2: . Theorem 
3.1 and the above definitions guarantee robust global asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium provided that there 
exists 1>ω  such that the following set of conditions holds for each np ,...,2= :  
 
1)1(... 2
21
<− ppiii nRRR p ω  
 
for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . Conditions (2.15) are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
(sufficiently small) constant 1>ω  satisfying the above inequalities for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , 
kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . Therefore, we conclude that Theorem 2.2 is a special case of Theorem 3.1. A more careful analysis 
similar to the above analysis reveals that the Nash equilibrium for the Cournot oligopoly game described in Section 2 
will be asymptotically stable provided that there exist n  sets of positive real numbers { }ijaA jii ≠= ,,  ( ni ,...,1= ) 
with ( )jji
ij
ij
j xax ,max≠≠
≤∑  for all nnxxx )(),...,( 1 +ℜ∈′=  and ni ,...,1=  such that the following set of conditions 
holds for each np ,...,2= :  
 
1......
2113221 ,,, <pp iiiiiiiii RRRaaa  
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for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . The above conditions are less restrictive than conditions (2.15); indeed, 
conditions (2.15) are implied by the above conditions for the special case 1, −= na ji  for all nji ,...,1, =  with ij ≠ . 
For example, for 3=n , the above small-gain conditions are equivalent to the existence of 0,, 321 >εεε  such that: 
 
1)1)(1)(1(
1)1)(1)(1(
1)1)(1(
1)1)(1(
1)1)(1(
1
32
1
1321
3
1
21321
1
3
1
232
3
1
131
2121
<+++
<+++
<++
<++
<++
−−
−
−−
−
εεε
εεε
εε
εε
εε
RRR
RRR
RR
RR
RR
 
 
For the above inequalities we have used 12,1 1 ε+=a , 113,1 1 −+= εa , 21,2 1 ε+=a , 123,2 1 −+= εa , 31,3 1 ε+=a  and 
1
32,3 1
−+= εa . By selecting 1321 === εεε , we obtain inequalities (2.16). 
 
 
It should be emphasized that the parameters 0>≥ rT  which are involved in the definition of the Consistent 
Backward-looking expectation (Definition 2.1), play no role in the small-gain conditions. Consequently, the small-
gain conditions can help us to decide whether the Nash equilibrium point is robustly stable without any knowledge 
of the expectation rules. The small-gain conditions (3.15) demand knowledge of the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  
and the best reply mappings iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3≥n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , 
nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...:  for which inequalities (3.8) hold. 
 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies heavily on recent results on dynamical systems (see [19]) and techniques developed 
for time-delay systems (see [18,19]) and is provided in the Appendix. An interesting corollary is given next. 
 
Corollary 3.2: If there exists 1>ω  such that conditions (3.15) hold for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , 
kj ii ≠  if kj ≠  then the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  is unique. 
 
The proof of Corollary 3.2 is exactly the same with the proof of Corollary 2.3: we show that the existence of an 
additional Nash equilibrium Sq ∈∗∗  contradicts robust global asymptotic stability of X∈0  for system (3.7). Details 
are left to the reader. 
 
Using Corollary 3.2 we may obtain conditions for uniqueness for a fixed point. Indeed, we have: 
 
Corollary 3.3: Let ikiS ℜ⊆  ( ni ,...,1= ) be closed, convex sets and let functions 
iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3≥n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...:  for 
which there exists Sqqq n ∈= ∗∗∗ ),...,( 1 , where nSSS ××= …1:  satisfying (3.3). Furthermore, suppose that there 
exist functions N∈ji,~γ  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) such that inequalities (3.8) hold for all Sq∈  and that there exists 
1>ω  such that conditions (3.15) hold for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . Then 
Sqqq n ∈= ∗∗∗ ),...,( 1  is the unique fixed point of the mapping SqfqfqFqS nn ∈=→∋ −− ))(),...,((:)( 11 .  
 
 
The reader should notice that Corollary 3.3 does not guarantee the existence of a fixed point for the mapping 
SqfqfqFqS nn ∈=→∋ −− ))(),...,((:)( 11 . Corollary 3.3 can be used in conjunction with classical fixed-point 
theorems (e.g., Brouwer’s fixed point theorem when all action spaces ikiS ℜ⊆  ( ni ,...,1= ) are compact and convex 
and when the mapping SqfqfqFqS nn ∈=→∋ −− ))(),...,((:)( 11  is continuous) in order to guarantee uniqueness of 
the fixed point. 
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4. Remarks on the Rational Expectation Case 
 
It is clear from Definition 2.1 that rational expectations )()(exp, tqtq jji =  are not necessarily consistent backward-
looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . Therefore, the case of rational expectations 
is not necessarily covered by the results of the previous sections. This point motivates the following definition for the 
strategic game described in the previous section. 
 
Definition 4.1: An expectation rule )(exp, tq ji   ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) is called a Rational-Consistent Backward-looking 
expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  if there exists a constant T<0  such that: 
 
],[
exp
, )(sup)( tTtjjjjtTt
jji qqqqqtq −
∗∗
≤≤−
∗ −=−≤− τ
τ
, for all 0≥t                                  (4.1) 
 
Clearly, rational expectations are Rational-Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . Moreover, a Consistent Backward-looking expectation (in the sense of Definition 2.1) is a 
Rational-Consistent Backward-looking expectation with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . 
 
Can we consider system (3.3) where all expectation rules jji Stq ∈)(exp,  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), are Rational-Consistent 
Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ ? The key mathematical problem 
that arises in this case is whether we can obtain a well-defined dynamical system: Remark (a) in previous section does 
not apply. However, we can extend the analysis of the previous section under the following hypothesis: 
 
 
(H’) There exist m  index sets },...,1{ nJ l ⊆ , ml ,...,1=  with ∅=∩ kl JJ  for kl ≠  and },...,1{,...,1 nJ lml =∪=  such 
that: 
 
All players with mJi∈  are using Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium 
point Sq ∈∗ . 
 
Moreover, for every 1,...,1 −= mk , the following statement  holds: 
 
All players with kJi∈  are using Rational-Consistent Backward-looking expectations, jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if lJj∈   with 
kl >  and Consistent Backward-looking expectations, jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if otherwise. 
 
 
Indeed, if hypothesis (H’) holds then system (3.3) is expressed in deviation variables ∗−= iii qtqtx )()(  ( ni ,...,1= ) by 
the following equations: 
 ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
klwithJjandJiifxts
klwithJjandJiifxts
qtstdqtstdqft
qqttxttx
qtstdqtstdqft
qqttxttx
lkrtTtji
lktTtjji
nnnnnnSnnSnn
nnnnSnn
nnnSS
S
n
n
n
≤∈∈=
>∈∈=
−++−+
−+−=
−++−+
−+−=
−−
−
∗−−∗−∗
∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
−
],[2,
],[,
1,1,11,1,1
1,1,12,12,1211
111111
:)(
:)(
,)()(Pr,...,)()(Pr))(1(
))((Pr)()(
,)()(Pr,...,)()(Pr))(1(
))((Pr)()(
11
2
1
θ
τθ
θ
τθ
#
                     (4.2) 
 
where ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ).  
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Let us explain next why system (4.2) is an infinite-dimensional dynamical system with state space X   being the 
normed linear space of bounded functions NTx ℜ→− ]0,[: , where nkkN ++= ...1  with norm )(sup
0
τ
τ
xx
T ≤≤−
=X . 
Indeed, by using the method of steps, given an initial condition X∈0x  and functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , 
],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) then one can in principle determine from (4.2) 
the solution mn txtxtx ℜ∈′= ))(),...,(()( 1  for ],0( rt∈  with )())(),...,(()( 01 ττττ xxxx n =′=  for all ]0,[ T−∈τ  using 
the following procedure: 
 
Step 1:  
 
First determine the solution )(txi  for ],0( rt∈  and for all players with mJi∈  who are using Consistent Backward-
looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗ . In this case, we are in a position to 
determine the components of the solution )(tx j  for mJj∈  and ],0( rt∈  by means of (4.2). Furthermore, in this 
case inequality (3.9) holds for ],0( rt∈ , mJi∈  and consequently there exists function N∈mG  such that: 
 ( )]0,[
],0[
)(sup Tmi
rt
xGtx −∈
≤ , for mJi∈                                                            (4.3) 
Step 2:  
 
Next determine the solution )(txi  for ],0( rt∈  and for all players with 1−∈ mJi  who are using Rational-Consistent 
Backward-looking expectations, jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if mJj∈  and Consistent Backward-looking expectations, 
jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if otherwise. In this case, (3.8) implies that the following inequality holds for all ],0( rt∈ : 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛≤ −
∈≠
−−
∉≠
],[,],[,
~max~max)(
tTtjji
Jj
ijrtTt
jji
Jj
ij
i xxtx
mm
γγ                                                  (4.4) 
However, the components of the solution )(tx j  for mJj∈  and ],0( rt∈  have been determined by Step 1. 
Therefore, we are in a position to determine the components of the solution )(tx j  for 1−∈ mJj  and ],0( rt∈  by 
means of (4.2). Using (4.3) and (4.4) we obtain the existence of a function N∈−1mG  such that: 
 ( )]0,[1
],0[
)(sup Tmi
rt
xGtx −−∈
≤ , for 1−∪∈ mm JJi                                                 (4.5) 
 
Step k  ( mk ≤≤3 ):  
 
We determine the solution )(txi  for ],0( rt∈  and for all players with kmJi −+∈ 1  who are using Rational-Consistent 
Backward-looking expectations, jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if lJj∈  with kml −+> 1  and Consistent Backward-looking 
expectations, jji Stq ∈)(exp,  if otherwise. In this case, (3.8) implies that the following inequality holds for all ],0( rt∈ : 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛≤ −
−+>
∈≠
−−
−+≤
∈≠
],[,
1
],[,
1
~max~max)(
tTtjji
kml
Jj
ijrtTt
jji
kml
Jj
ij
i xxtx
ll
γγ                                           (4.6) 
 
However, the components of the solution )(tx j  for lJj∈  with kml −+> 1  and ],0( rt∈  have been determined by 
previous steps. Therefore, we are in a position to determine the components of the solution )(tx j  for kmJj −+∈ 1  and 
],0( rt∈  by means of (4.2). Moreover, by virtue of previous steps there exists there exists function N∈−+ kmG 2  such 
that: 
 ( )]0,[2
],0[
)(sup Tkmi
rt
xGtx −−+∈
≤ , for lmkml Ji ,...,2−+= ∪∈                                            (4.7) 
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Using (4.6) and (4.7) we obtain the existence of a function N∈−+ kmG 1  such that: 
 ( )]0,[1
],0[
)(sup Tkmi
rt
xGtx −−+∈
≤ , for lmkml Ji ,...,1−+= ∪∈                                            (4.8) 
 
After the completion of the m  steps we have determined all components of the solution )(tx j  for nj ,...,1=  and 
],0( rt∈ . Moreover, we have also constructed a function N∈G  such that: 
 ( )]0,[
],0[
)(sup T
rt
xGtx −∈
≤                                                                      (4.9) 
 
Without loss of generality we may assume that ssG ≥)(  for all 0≥s . Moreover, by using (4.9) we may conclude 
exactly as in the previous section that estimates (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) hold. 
 
The proof of the following theorem is exactly the same with the proof of the Theorem 3.1 and therefore is omitted. 
 
Theorem 4.2: X∈0  is Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (4.2) under hypothesis (H’), if there exists 
1>ω  such that the set of conditions (3.15) holds for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ , 
where )(~:)( ,, ss jiji ωγωγ = . 
 
It should be emphasized that the parameters 0>≥ rT , which are involved in the definition of the Consistent 
Backward-looking expectation (Definition 2.1), play no role in the small-gain conditions. Moreover, the number m  
of the index sets },...,1{ nJ l ⊆  involved in hypothesis (H’) or the particular members of each index set play 
absolutely no role in the small-gain conditions (3.15). Furthermore, all these parameters are allowed to change with 
time: there is no need to assume that these parameters remain constant. Consequently, the small-gain conditions can 
help us to decide whether the Nash equilibrium point is robustly stable without any knowledge of the expectation 
rules. Again, the small-gain conditions (3.15) demand knowledge of the Nash equilibrium point Sq ∈∗  and the best 
reply mappings iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3>n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , 
nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...:  for which inequalities (3.8) hold. 
 
    Finally, it should be noted that for a specific strategic game, even less demanding hypotheses than hypothesis (H’) 
can be used in order to guarantee that system (3.3) gives an infinite-dimensional dynamical system with state space 
X   being the normed linear space of bounded functions NTx ℜ→− ]0,[: , where nkkN ++= ...1  with norm 
)(sup
0
τ
τ
xx
T ≤≤−
=X . This can be done by exploiting special properties of the best reply mappings 
iniii SSSSSf →××××× +− ......: 111  for ni <<1 , 3>n  and 121 ...: SSSf n →×× , nnn SSSf →×× −11 ...:  (e.g., if 
some of the functions are independent of certain arguments).  
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
   In this work, advanced stability methods have been used in order to provide sufficient conditions, called cyclic 
small gain conditions, which guarantee robust global asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. 
The obtained results are powerful because they can be applied to uncertain models for which the players form 
consistent expectations based on the history of the game. In addition, by formulating dynamic game-theoretical 
models by means of Functional Difference Equations, it is possible to obtain all features of continuous-time and 
discrete-time models. A Cournot oligopoly game has been used in order to illustrate the theoretical results. 
 
   Future research can address the economic meaning of small-gain conditions to other games used in economic 
research (e.g., the study of the stability properties of the Walrasian equilibrium of an abstract economy). A step 
towards this research direction is the fact that the results presented in this work can be directly extended to the case 
where the best reply mappings are set-valued maps instead of functions, i.e., iii Sqf ⊆− )( . However, in this case 
inequalities (3.8) must be modified in the following way: 
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( )∗
≠
∗ −≤− jjji
ij
i qqqp ,
~max γ , for all )( ii qfp −∈  and ni ,...,1=                                  (3.8’) 
 
The above set of inequalities directly implies that the Nash equilibrium point satisfies }{)( ∗∗− = iii qqf  for all 
ni ,...,1= . With this modification, Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.2, Corollary 3.3 and Theorem 4.2 hold in this case as 
well. Future research can also address the issue of studying dynamic game-theoretical models by means of recent 
results in hybrid systems theory (see [24,25]) or the issue of stabilization of Nash equilibria for dynamic game-
theoretical models by means of nonlinear feedback laws, using recently proposed methodologies (see for example 
[22,23]). 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Theorem 2.2: Notice that (2.10) implies that the followings equations hold for all 0≥t : 
 
( )
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+
−−+−=
−−
∗∗
≠
∑
],[,],0[
exp
,
exp
,],0[],0[
)(Pr)(
)(
22
Pr))(1())((Pr)()(
rtTtjjjijQji
ij
ji
ii
i
QiiiQii
qqtdqtq
tq
Kb
b
Kb
cab
tttqttq
j
ii
θτθ
  , ni ,...,1=            (A.1) 
 
 
Using the fact that yxyx UU −≤− )(Pr)(Pr  for every nyx ℜ∈, , where nU ℜ⊆  is a closed convex set, in 
conjunction with ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+
−= ∑
≠
∗∗
ij
j
ii
i
Qi qKb
b
Kb
cab
q
i 22
Pr ],0[  and ],0[)( Θ∈tiθ  with 1<Θ , we obtain from (A.1) for 
ni ,...,1= : 
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22
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,
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,
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exp
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                (A.2) 
 
Combining (A.2) with (2.8) and using definitions 0
2
>+= ii Kb
bR , 
i
ii
i Q
qtq
tx
∗−= )()( , 0, >=
i
j
ji Q
Q
g  ( ij ≠ , 
ni ,...,1= ) , we conclude that for every X∈0x  and for every set of functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , 
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]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), the solution X∈tx  of (2.11) with initial condition X∈= 00 xxt  
corresponding to inputs ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) satisfies:  
 
∑
≠ −−
−− −+≤
ij
rtTtjjiiirtTtiii
xgRtxttx
],[,],[
))(1()()( θθ  for all 0tt ≥                                   (A.3) 
 
We notice that system (2.11) is an autonomous uncertain dynamical system in the sense described in [15,16,17]. Next 
we show that X∈0  is a robust equilibrium point for system (2.11) in the sense described in [15,16,17], i.e., for every 
0>ε , 0>T  there exists 0),(: >= Tεδδ  such that if δ≤X0x  then for every set of functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , 
],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), the solution X∈tx  of (2.11) with initial condition 
X∈0x  corresponding to inputs ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) satisfies 
ε≤= − ],[ tTtt xx X  for all ],0[ Tt∈ . To see this, notice that (A.3) implies the existence of a constant 0≥G  such 
that: 
 
]0,[],0[
],0[
)(sup Tr
rt
xGxtx −∈
≤=                                                               (A.4) 
 
Without loss of generality we may assume that 1≥G . Inequality (A.4) implies that  
 
]0,[],[ TtTt xGx −− ≤ , for all ],0[ rt∈                                                  (A.5) 
 
Working in this way and using induction we may establish that for every positive integer 0>k  it holds that 
 
]0,[],[ T
k
tTt xGx −− ≤ , for all ],0[ krt∈                                                   (A.6) 
 
Therefore (A.6) implies that  
 [ ] [ ]
XX 0
/1
]0,[
/1
],[ xGxGxx
rt
T
rt
tTtt
+
−
+
− =≤= , for all 0≥t                        (A.7) 
 
where [ ]rt /  denotes the integer part of rt / . Consequently, (A.7) implies that for every 0>ε , 0>T  there exists 
[ ] 0),(: /1 >== −− rTGT εεδδ  such that if δ≤X0x  then for every set of functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , 
],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), the solution X∈tx  of (2.11) with initial condition 
X∈0x  corresponding to inputs ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , ]1,1[:, −→ℜ+jid  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) satisfies 
ε≤= − ],[ tTtt xx X  for all ],0[ Tt∈ . Therefore X∈0  is a robust equilibrium point for system (2.11) in the sense 
described in [15,16,17]. 
 
The reader should notice that inequality (A.3) implies the following inequality for all ni ,...,1=  and Θ>μ : 
 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Θ−
Θ−≤ ∑
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ij
rtTtjjiirtTtii
xgRxtx
],[,],[
,max)( μ
μμμ  for all 0tt ≥                     (A.8) 
 
Let 0>σ  and consider the family of functionals +ℜ→X:iV , ni ,...,1=  defined by: 
 ( )σττ
τ
exp)(sup)(
0
ii
T
i xQxV ≤≤−
=                                                               (A.9) 
 
Let ),0( rh∈  and 0≥t  be arbitrary. Definition (A.9) and inequality (A.8) imply that: 
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Using definition (A.9) and the facts that 0, >=
i
j
ji Q
Q
g  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) and 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −Θ−
Θ−−≤
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Θ−
Θ−−≤
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−−−+Θ−
Θ−
−−−+−
≤
≤
+≤≤≠+≤≤
≠+≤≤+≤≤
≠ −≤≤−+≤≤
−≤≤−+≤≤
+
∑
∑
)(supmax)exp()1(,)(sup)exp(,)(expmax
)(sup)exp(,)(sup)exp(,)(expmax
)(expexpexp)(supsup
,)(expexpexp)(supsup,)(exp
max
)(
sj
htstij
isi
htst
ti
ij
sj
htst
isi
htst
ti
ij
j
rwT
j
htst
i
ii
rwThtst
ti
hti
xVTnRxVTxVh
xVTRxVTxVh
htswwwsxQR
htswwwsxQxVh
xV
σμ
μμσμσ
σμ
μμσμσ
σσσμ
μμ
σσσμσ
 
 
Consequently, for every ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ , 0>σ , ),0( rh∈  and 0≥t  it holds that: 
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Using induction and (A.10), we can show that for every ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ , 0>σ , ),0( rh∈ , 0≥t  and for every 
non-negative integer 0≥k , it holds that: 
 
( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −Θ−
Θ−−≤
+≤≤≠+≤≤+
)(supmax)exp()1(,)(sup)exp(),(expmax)( sj
khtstij
isi
khtst
tikhti xVTnRxVTxVhkxV σμ
μμσμσ  
(A.11) 
 
Therefore, (A.11) implies that for every ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ , 0>σ  and 0≥t  the following inequality holds:  
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Next, we assume that )2ln(1−< Tσ . The reader should notice that definition (A.8) implies that 
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0
τ
τ
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where ini
Qq
,...,1
min: == . It follows from (A.12), (A.13) and definition (A.9) (which implies Xtti xQxV ≤)(  for 
i
ni
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=
= ) that the following inequalities hold for every ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ , 0>σ  and 0≥t  with )2ln(1−< Tσ : 
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where XxxL =:)(  and ini RR ,...,1max: == . It follows from (A.13), (A.14), (A.15) and Theorem 3.1 in [19] that X∈0  is 
Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (2.11), provided that the following set of conditions holds for 
each np ,...,2= : 
 
1)exp()1(
1
<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Θ−
Θ−− TpnRR
p
p
ii p σμ
μμ…                                         (A.16) 
 
for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠  and 
 
1)exp( <Tσμ                                                                    (A.17) 
 
Notice that if conditions (2.15) hold for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠  then the conditions 
(A.16), (A.17) hold for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠  for sufficiently small 0>σ  and 
for )1,(Θ∈μ  sufficiently close to 1. The proof is complete.       
 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We first notice that system (3.7) is an autonomous dynamical system in the sense described in 
[15,16,17]. Next we show that X∈0  is a robust equilibrium point for system (3.7) in the sense described in 
[15,16,17], i.e., for every 0>ε , 0>T  there exists 0),(: >= Tεδδ  such that if δ≤X0x  then for every set of 
functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ), the solution 
X∈tx  of (3.7) with initial condition X∈0x  corresponding to inputs ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) satisfies ε≤= − ],[ tTtt xx X  for all ],0[ Tt∈ . Without loss of 
generality we may assume that the function N∈G  involved in (3.13) is a strictly increasing function. Define 
[ ]( ) ( )sGs rT /1:)( +=κ  for every 0>T , which is a strictly increasing, continuous function with 0)0( =κ  and 
+∞=+∞→ )(lim ss κ  (recall that ssG ≥)(  for all 0≥s ) and define 
++− ℜ→ℜ:1κ  to be the inverse function of κ  on 
+ℜ . Indeed, (3.13) implies that for every 0>ε , 0>T  there exists 0)(),(: 1 >== − εκεδδ T  such that if δ≤X0x  
then for every set of functions ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , ],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , 
nji ,...,1, = ), the solution X∈tx  of (3.7) with initial condition X∈0x  corresponding to inputs ],0[: Θ→ℜ+iθ , 
],[: Tri →ℜ+τ , { }1::, ≤ℜ∈→ℜ+ ddd jkji  ( ij ≠ , nji ,...,1, = ) satisfies ε≤= − ],[ tTtt xx X  for all 
],0[ Tt∈ . Therefore X∈0  is a robust equilibrium point for system (3.7) in the sense described in [15,16,17]. 
 
Let 0>σ  and consider the family of functionals +ℜ→X:iV , ni ,...,1=  defined by: 
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Using definition (A.18) and (3.9) we obtain for every ),0( Th∈ , ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ  and 0≥t : 
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Consequently, for every ni ,...,1= , 0>σ , ),0( Th∈ , Θ>μ  and 0≥t  it holds that: 
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Using induction and (A.19), we can show that for every ni ,...,1= , 0>σ , ),0( Th∈ , Θ>μ , 0≥t  and for every 
non-negative integer 0≥k , it holds that: 
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Therefore, (A.20) implies that for every ni ,...,1= , Θ>μ , 0>σ  and 0≥t  the following inequality holds:  
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The reader should notice that definition (A.18) implies that )(sup)(2
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consequently: 
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Without loss of generality we may assume 0>Θ . Define Θ+−
Θ=
1
: ω
ωμ  and let the constant 0>σ  satisfy the 
inequalities: )2ln(1−≤ Tσ , )ln(1 ωσ −≤ T  and ⎟⎟⎠
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Θ+−< − ω
ωσ 1ln1T , where 1>ω  is the constant involved in the 
hypotheses of the theorem. Notice that the hypothesis 1<Θ  and previous definitions imply that 1)exp( <Tσμ , 
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Θ>μ , ωσ ≤)exp( T  and ωμ
μμ ≤Θ−
Θ− . It follows from (A.21), (A.22) and definition (A.18) (which implies 
Xtti xxV ≤)( ) that the following inequalities hold for every ni ,...,1=  and 0≥t : 
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where XxxL =:)(  and 1)exp(: <= TB σμ . It follows from (A.22), (A.23), (A.24) and Theorem 3.1 in [19] that 
X∈0  is Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (3.7), provided that the set of conditions (3.15) holds 
for each np ,...,2=  and for all },...,1{ ni j ∈ , kj ii ≠  if kj ≠ . The proof is complete.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
